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LIMITING THE AVAILABILITY OF
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF FOR BURDEN-
SHIFTING ERRORS-FOURTH CIRCUIT
AVOIDS HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS
WITH A FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR
STANDARD: FULTON v. WARDEN,
MAR YLAND PENITENTIARY
Federal habeas corpus,' once merely a jurisdictional remedy
for federal prisoners only,2 currently enables one convicted of a
See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53 (4th ed. 1983). The writ of habeas
corpus is a post-conviction vehicle by which one being held in custody may challenge the
legal authority of that detention. Id. Stemming from the common law writ by which thir-
teenth century courts compelled the attendance of necessary parties to the proceedings, it
eventually evolved into an independent civil proceeding designed to challenge allegedly ille-
gal detentions. See 3 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.1(b), at 285-88
(1984). The availability of the remedy was considered important enough by the Framers to
warrant protection under the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("[t]he privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in [c]ases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it"). It is unclear, however, whether the power of the
federal courts to issue the writ is constitutionally rooted or only statutory in nature. See L.
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 17, at 77-80 (1981). Several commentators have taken
the position that the Framers intended to protect only the availability of habeas relief for
federal prisoners, see, e.g., W. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 40
(1893); W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 26 (1980), a common prac-
tice of state courts until it was held to be an unauthorized infringement upon federal au-
thority in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 523-26 (1859). Others have taken the
view that the Suspension Clause is an independent source of judicial power, directing both
state and federal courts to issue the writ when appropriate. See, e.g., Paschal, The Constitu-
tion and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE LJ. 605, 607. While the Supreme Court has never had
occasion to determine authoritatively the question inasmuch as the habeas jurisdiction of
the federal courts has been statutorily authorized since the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1789, see infra notes 2-3, several of the Court's opinions imply that it may well be constitu-
tionally rooted, see, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1963) (statutory re-
strictions on "the traditional liberality of the writ . . . might raise serious constitutional
questions"); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963) (jurisdictional statute "imple-
ments the constitutional command" of availability of writ)(dictum).
2 See L. YACKLE, supra note 1, § 19, at 84; Comment, Development of Federal Habeas
Corpus Since Stone v. Powell, 1979 WIs. L. REv. 1145, 1147. The statutory authority of the
federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus was granted by the Judiciary Act of 1789, see
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82. The original Act, by its terms, was
available only to those held in allegedly unlawful federal custody. See Ex parte Dorr, 44
U.S. 103, 105 (1845). Patterned largely after English habeas practice, the scope of the
courts' authority under the statute was interpreted as allowing the writ to issue only if the
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crime in state court to attack collaterally the conviction in federal
court based on a violation of a federal right.3 Until recently, once
the necessary prerequisites to gain review were overcome,4 a show-
trial court had lacked jurisdiction, thereby rendering the judgment null and void. L. YACKLE,
supra note 1, § 19, at 84-85; see Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 201-02 (1830)
(discussing origin and availability of writ). Although the judiciary later gave the concept of
"jurisdiction" with respect to habeas a rather liberal interpretation, see, e.g., Ex parte Sie-
bold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879) (lower courts lack jurisdiction when prisoner convicted
under unconstitutional statute), and subsequently abandoned the restriction altogether, see
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (per curiam), this occurred only after the
availability of the remedy was expanded by statute, see Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14
Stat. 385, 386 (empowering federal courts to issue writ "where any person may be restrained
...in violation of the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States"); see also
infra note 3. For a thorough discussion of early Supreme Court decisions regarding the "ju-
risdictional defect" restriction, see 3 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.3, at 307-11.
3 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). In 1867, Congress enlarged the scope of the federal
habeas remedy to include those held in state custody "in violation of the constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States." Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386.
The current version of the Act with regard to state prisoners is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(1982), which provides:
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a [s]tate court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982) (power and jurisdiction of federal courts to hear habeas
corpus petitions). Although federal habeas relief is conceivably appropriate by the terms of
the statute when a person is imprisoned by a state in violation of federal law or treaties, see,
e.g., Llamas-Almaguer v. Wainwright, 666 F.2d 191, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1982) (federal wiretap
statute), virtually all habeas actions by state prisoners involve federal constitutional claims,
3 IV. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.3(e), at 328; L. YAcKLE, supra note 1, § 91, at
360. Thus, it is not uncommon for courts, including the Supreme Court, to refer only to
constitutional claims when discussing habeas relief for state prisoners. See 3 W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.3(e), at 328 n.95.
While there is little, if any, disagreement that the 1867 Act was intended to provide
federal habeas relief for those held in state custody, see id. § 27.2(b), at 292, there have been
divergent opinions as to whether it also was intended to expand the scope of the remedy
beyond jurisdictional challenges to encompass all constitutional violations, compare Baton,
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv.
441, 475 (1963) (Act not intended to expand habeas review beyond jurisdictional determina-
tions) with Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST.
LJ. 367, 375-76 (1983) (read in light of other post-Civil War enactments, Act intended to
ensure all federal rights respected by state courts). Although the issue seemingly would have
been settled by the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953)
(all federal constitutional questions raised by state prisoners cognizable in federal habeas
corpus), at least one authority notes that there are indications that the current Court may
favor the "narrower interpretation of the 1867 Act," tempered by the recognition that prior
precedent has allowed the writ to go beyond mere "jurisdictional defects." 3 W. LAFAvE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 27.2, at 295-96.
4 See generally L. YACKLE, supra note 1, §§ 41-104 (requirements necessary for habeas
writ). As mandated by statute, one seeking federal habeas relief must be in "custody,"
which may take a form other than actual imprisonment. See, e.g., Hensley v. Municipal
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ing by the petitioner that constitutional error had occurred at the
trial stage generally resulted in a grant of the writ of habeas
corpus.5 However, the doctrine of harmless errors now enables fed-
Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (petitioner in "custody" although released on his own recog-
nizance); Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1972) (military reservist in "custody" of su-
perior officers); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (prisoner in "custody" al-
though paroled). A petitioner also must be able to show a violation of the Constitution or a
federal law or treaty. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). Additionally, a petitioner must have
exhausted all available and effective remedies open to a state prisoner in state court, Slay-
ton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53, 54 (1971); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b), (c) (1982), even if there has been a clear violation of some constitutional right, see
Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1981) (per curiam). If the claim before the federal
court differs from that presented to the state court, or if the petition contains both ex-
hausted and unexhausted claims, the exhaustion requirement will not be met. See Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (mixed petition); Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971)
(different claim). Finally, the most complex and confusing requirements involve situations
in which petitioners are foreclosed from state review of their claims because of a failure to
raise an objection during the trial stage. See Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2906 (1984);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 116 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 75 (1977). In
Wainwright, the Court held that a defendant's failure to make a contemporaneous objection
would bar habeas relief unless a showing of "cause" for the failure to object and "prejudice"
resulting from the error was made. 433 U.S. at 87. Subsequent decisions have not clarified
the parameters of "cause" and "prejudice," and appear to be somewhat inconsistent. Com-
pare Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 2912 (1984) (novelty of burden-shifting claim sufficient
reason for "cause") with Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133 (1982) (claim that shifting of
burden of proving self-defense to defendant not novel). It should be noted, however, that
when a state appellate court addresses a constitutional claim on the merits despite a proce-
dural default, that default will no longer be a bar to federal habeas relief. See County Court
of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). For an in-depth discussion on the re-
quirements necessary to gain habeas review, see L. YACKLE, supra note 1, §§ 41-104.
6 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (habeas remedy available unless peti-
tioner has deliberately bypassed state procedural rule) and Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
508 (1953) (Habeas Corpus Act provides broad federal review) with Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (full and fair litigation in state court bars federal habeas relief for
violation of exclusionary rule).
I See 3 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 26.6(a), at 257-61; R. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLREss ERROR 14 (1970); Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak
Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422-23 (1980); Note, Harmful Use of Harmless
Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 538, 540 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cornell
Note]. Generally, harmless error has been defined as error that does not affect the outcome
of a trial, see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83, 83 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Stanford Note], or as error that does not result in a substantial wrong or a
miscarriage of justice, see Goldberg, supra, at 422; see also 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 21, at 392-94 (3d ed. 1940) (discussing approaches and proposals for defining
error).
Under early common law in the United States, even the most trivial of errors was pre-
sumed to prejudice the defendant, and required an automatic reversal of the conviction. R.
TRAYNOR, supra, at 13; see 3 W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 1, § 26.6(a), at 257. This
was the result of the adoption by American courts of the English Exchequer Rule, generally
believed to have been first enunciated in Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1359 (1835).
See 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 21, at 367-68; Goldberg, supra, at 422. But see R. TRAYNOR,
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eral appellate courts to deem most constitutional errors harmless,7
with automatic reversal required for only a limited number of enu-
merated types of errors." Presently, the Supreme Court requires
supra, at 4-8 (rule created by subsequent misreading of Crease). Applications of the rule
often produced absurd results. See, e.g., People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406, 407 (1880) (convic-
tion reversed because the letter "n" left out of "larceny" in indictment); Williams v. State,
27 Wis. 402, 403 (1871) (conviction reversed because words "and dignity" omitted from in-
dictment that stated offense was "against the peace of the State").
As a result of the rigid application of the rule, "the criminal trial became a game for
sowing reversible error in the record." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
By deliberately making errors adverse to their own cause during trial, counsel were assured
of a new trial in case of defeat. Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 3 VmL. L. REv. 48, 49 (1957). Responding to a reform move-
ment by several distinguished members of the bar, see Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 758-60 &
nn.10-14; Goldberg, supra, at 422 & n.15, Congress enacted § 269 of the Judicial Code, re-
quiring courts to ignore "technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties," see Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181.
7 See, e.g., Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 457 (1983) (ex parte communication be-
tween judge and juror); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-12 (1983) (prosecutor's
remarks on failure of defendants to produce evidence); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
372-73 (1972) (erroneously admitted confession); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250,
253-54 (1969) (inability to cross-examine co-defendants' confessions). In Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court noted for the first time that some constitutional errors
may be deemed harmless, see id. at 22, and determined that, because violations of federal
constitutional rights are federal questions, a federal standard should be applied to deter-
mine whether such violations are harmless, see id. at 21. Determining that "some constitu-
tional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant
that they may. . . be deemed harmless," id. at 22, the Chapman Court fashioned a broad
test for harmless error, see id. at 23. The Chapman test requires the beneficiary of the error
to bear the burden of convincing a reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the conviction. Id. at 24. After enunciating the test for constitutional
harmless error, however, the Chapman Court determined that the strength of the evidence
against the defendants was not such that, absent the prosecutor's erroneous comment on the
defendants' failure to testify, the jury would clearly have reached a verdict of guilty. See id.
at 24-26. Determining that the probable effect of the error was to reduce the probative value
of the defendants' version of the evidence in the eyes of the jury, the Court could not de-
clare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction. See
id. at 26.
Commentators have questioned whether the Court's subsequent decisions have retained
the Chapman test for harmless error. See, e.g., Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Fed-
eral Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 16 (1976)
(viewing cases as applying three different tests); Goldberg, supra note 6, at 427-28 (reading
opinions as subtle rearrangements of words and ideas as process of eroding constitutional
rights); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. Rav. 988, 1015-18 (1973) -(in-
trepreting post-Chapman cases as gradual erosion of prosecutor's burden of proving harm-
lessness of error).
8 See R McNAMARA, CONsTTrrUoNAL LinTATzONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.07, at
327 (1982). In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court cited three
examples of constitutional errors that may never be deemed harmless: Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (absence of counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568
(1958) (coerced confession); and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) (biased judge). See
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reversal for errors that either violate rights considered as "basic to
a fair trial," or whose prejudicial scope is not "readily identifi-
able."9 Nevertheless, the Court has been unable to agree as to
whether automatic reversal is necessary when jury instructions un-
constitutionally shift the burden of proof on an element of the
crime charged to the defendant."0 While the federal courts of ap-
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8. The Court subsequently has recognized other constitutional
errors that can never be harmless. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979) (dis-
crimination in grand jury selection); Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123 (1976) (petit jury);
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) (absence of speedy trial); Price v. Georgia,
398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (double jeopardy).
See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (deprivation of right to effec-
tive counsel not subject to principled review of possible prejudicial effect); Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967) (citing examples of "constitutional rights. . . so basic to
a fair trial that their infraction can never be . . .harmless error"); see also supra note 8.
Although these broad, general principles have been formulated, the Court has never an-
nounced a precise standard for determining whether certain errors, as yet unaddressed by
the Court in the harmless error context, merit automatic reversal or harmless analysis. See
Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53
MINN. L. REv. 519, 525, 538-39 (1969); Comment, Principles for Application of the Harmless
Error Standard, 41 U. CHL L. REV. 616, 616 (1974). Uncertainty as to which constitutional
errors require automatic reversal, other than those mentioned in Chapman or subsequently
recognized by the Court, stems from the Chapman decision itself. Note, Harmless Constitu-
tional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 814, 816 (1970). Although the Court recog-
nized that errors "basic to a fair trial" require automatic reversal, it was silent on how such
a determination is to be made. Id.; see Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. But see Chapman, 386
U.S. at 51 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (discussing factors to be considered).
Several different standards have been suggested by commentators for determining
whether a certain type of constitutional error merits automatic reversal or harmless error
analysis. See, e.g., Mause, supra, at 540-47 (automatic reversal warranted when error is in-
herently prejudicial); Note, supra, at 820 (automatic reversal warranted when error
"bias[es] the machinery for bringing evidence before the jury and into the record"); Stan-
ford Note, supra note 6, at 89 (automatic reversal for errors affecting guilt-determination
process); Comment, supra, at 620 (automatic reversal for violation of "fundamental" rights).
See generally 3 W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 1, § 26.6, at 272-77 (examining case law
and various analyses that have attempted to formulate standard).
10 See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1977 (1985) (declining to address ques-
tion of whether harmless error analysis generally is applicable to burden-shifting instruc-
tions); Koehler v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 1673, 1673 (1984) (affirming without opinion by an
equally divided court, Justice Marshall not participating); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S.
73, 87-88 (1983) (plurality opinion; eight justices equally divided, Justice Stevens deciding
on other grounds); cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (declining to address
question because not addressed by state court).
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause protects an accused from being adjudged guilty in a criminal trial except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of all the facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. Id. at
364. Since the Winship decision, the Court has found jury instructions unconstitutional
under the standard set forth in Winship in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 522-24 (1979) (instruction that "[t]he law presumes that a person
intends the necessary and natural consequences of his acts" may have been interpreted as
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peal have taken different approaches in resolving the issue,11 the
courts generally have not applied different standards for reversal
on habeas, as opposed to direct, review once such a constitutional
violation has been found to have occurred.12 Recently, however, in
burden-shifting or conclusive presumption by jury); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-
04 (1975) (instructions placing burden on defendant to prove provocation to reduce murder
to manslaughter unconstitutional when malice is essential element under state definition of
murder); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 100, 104 (1972) (instruction to jury to ignore
defense testimony unless it believed testimony true beyond reasonable doubt relieved prose-
cution's burden of proof). Yet, the Court has been unable to reach a consensus as to whether
unconstitutional instructions may ever be deemed harmless. See, e.g., Koehler, 104 S. Ct. at
1673; Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87-88.
" See, e.g., Patterson v. Austin, 728 F.2d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir. 1984) (burden-shifting
instruction may be harmless when overwhelming evidence of guilt present); Engle v. Koeh-
ler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir. 1983) (instruction that shifts burden of proof on intent "can
be extremely prejudicial even if overall proof of intent or malice is substantial" if defendant
disputes intent), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 104 S. Ct. 1673 (1984);
United States v. Harrigan, 586 F.2d 860, 863 (1st Cir. 1978) (harmless error doctrine could
not prevent reversal when erroneous instruction might have been difference between convic-
tion and acquittal); Trimble v. Stynchcombe, 481 F.2d 1175, 1176 (5th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam) (harmless error principle inapplicable when alibi and reasonable-doubt instructions
"wholly inconsistent").
There appear to be several different approaches to resolving the question of whether a
burden-shifting error was harmless. One approach makes harmlessness dependent upon
whether the subject of the instruction was a disputed issue at trial. See, e.g., In re Hamilton,
721 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1983) (instruction that shifts burden of proof on intent cannot
be harmless if intent at issue); Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121, 125 (6th Cir.) (erroneous
instruction on intent harmless when defendant concedes intent), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866
(1980). A second approach goes beyond the "disputed issue" question to ask whether there
was overwhelming evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342 (11th
Cir. 1982) (erroneous instruction harmless when evidence of guilt overwhelming), cert. de-
nied, 460 U.S. 1024 (1983); United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 320 & n.24 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (burden-shifting alibi instructions not harmless when sole evidence was credibility of
witnesses, but strong evidence of guilt may support finding of no prejudice). Another ap-
proach is to find such errors harmful per se. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371,
1380 (5th Cir. 1979) (burden-shifting intent instructions may never be harmless); Trimble v.
Stynchcombe, 481 F.2d 1175, 1176 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (inconsistent instructions on
alibi and reasonable-doubt never harmless).
12 L. YACKLE, supra note 1, § 94; see, e.g., Phillips v. Rose, 690 F.2d 79, 81 (6th Cir.
1982) (per curiam) (remanding for issuance of conditional writ of habeas corpus because
Sandstrom error found not to be harmless); Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1342 (11th
Cir. 1982) (overwhelming evidence of guilt rendered burden-shifting error harmless); Dietz
v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 130-31 (8th Cir. 1981) (Sandstrom error may be attacked in habeas
corpus proceeding on issue of burden shifting); cf. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372
(1972) (affirming denial of habeas corpus relief because allegedly erroneous admission of
confession was harmless beyond reasonable doubt); Wilson v. Estelle, 625 F.2d 1158, 1159-60
(5th Cir. 1980) (petition for habeas corpus properly denied because any error in admitting
prior conviction was harmless beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
Compare Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1977 (1985) (affirming grant of habeas corpus
relief when burden-shifting error not harmless) with Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
527 (1979) (reversing, on direct review, state court conviction due to unconstitutional in-
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Fulton v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary,13 the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, after determining that constitutionally erro-
neous burden-shifting instructions are not subject to automatic re-
versal,14 held that harmless error analysis is improper when the ap-
peal results from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus. 15 Instead, the
court required the petitioners to meet the higher standard of dem-
onstrating that the constitutionally erroneous instructions had ren-
dered the trial fundamentally unfair.'
Fulton involved consolidated appeals from denials of writs of
habeas corpus to two defendants, each of whom had been con-
victed in state court on unrelated charges of first-degree murder.' 7
At their trials, the defendants each produced some evidence in
support of an alibi defense.' 8 The jury instructions in each case
placed the burden of proof as to the alibi defenses on the defen-
dants." Having been found guilty, each defendant sought habeas
corpus relief in federal district court by challenging the constitu-
tionality of the instructions. 2 The district court in each case held
that although the challenged instructions were indeed unconstitu-
tional, they were harmless. 21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's denials of habeas corpus relief.2 2 Writing
for the majority, Chief Judge Winter noted the unconstitutionality
of the instructions, pointing out the conflict existing among the cir-
cuits whether burden-shifting errors can ever be harmless. 23 Con-
structions; remanded for determination of whether to apply harmless error analysis).
IS 744 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3532 (1985).
14 Id. at 1031.
15 See id. at 1032.
16 See id.
" See id. at 1027-28.
18 See id. at 1027.
19 Id. at 1030-31.
20 Id. at 1027. In each case, the district court determined that the defendants had ex-
hausted all their state remedies as required by statute. See Robinson v. Warden, Md. Peni-
tentiary, 518 F. Supp. 219, 219-20 (D. Md. 1981); Fulton v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 517
F. Supp. 485, 486 (D. Md. 1981); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1982) (requiring exhaustion of
state remedies).
21 Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1027-28. The district court in each case applied the harmless
constitutional error rule formulated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-23 (1967), see
supra note 7, and found that the overwhelming evidence of guilt coupled with the weakness
of the alibis made the possibility that the errors contributed-to the convictions remote, see
Robinson v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 518 F. Supp. 219, 222-23 (D. Md. 1981); Fulton v.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 517 F. Supp. 485, 489 (D. Md. 1981).
22 See 744 F.2d at 1028, 1033, 1034.
23 See id. at 1031; see also supra note 7. Since the explicit wording of the instructions
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cluding that "there is no per se rule of reversal" for such constitu-
tional violations,24 Judge Winter noted that a consideration of the
record as a whole in each case was required to determine the im-
pact of the errors.25 The court then determined that because the
appeals arose from habeas corpus proceedings, the proper standard
of review was whether the errors had rendered the state trials fun-
damentally unfair, a "more demanding standard" than required on
direct review of a criminal conviction.2 After reviewing the record
of each case, the court concluded that in light of the evidence,
neither trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the respective
error, and therefore affirmed both convictions.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Phillips contended that any in-
struction that effectively shifts to the defendant the burden of
proving an essential element of the crime charged is per se harm-
ful, and thus any inquiry into harmlessness is inappropriate. 28
Judge Phillips, however, did not discuss the majority's imposition
of a "fundamentally unfair" requirement, noting instead that
"[tihe majority affirms the denial of habeas corpus relief in both of
these cases on the basis that in each . . . [the error] was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt .... "I"
Although the Fulton court correctly noted that one seeking to
overturn a criminal conviction for allegedly erroneous jury instruc-
tions bears a heavier burden on collateral review than on direct
appeal, it is submitted that this distinction relates only to the ne-
in the Fulton cases affirmatively shifted the burden of proof of the element of presence to
the defendants, there was no controversy on this point; indeed, the state conceded the un-
constitutionality of the instructions. See 744 F.2d at 1031. Thus, the instructions were un-
like those in which the use of presumptions make the constitutionality of the instructions
dependent on their precise wording and meaning in the context of the instructions as a
whole. Compare Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517 (1979) (instruction that inference
of intent is mandatory presumption is unconstitutional) with County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-63 (1979) (instruction that inference of possession is
permissive presumption is constitutional).
24 744 F.2d at 1031.
25 See id. at 1031-32; accord United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (review-
ing court must consider trial record as whole).
26 744 F.2d at 1032. The Fulton court stated that "strict harmless error analysis is not
wholly appropriate" on collateral review of erroneous jury instructions. Id. The court rea-
soned that because on collateral review a petitioner must meet a higher level of proof than is
required on direct review, the proper test is not the "less demanding" one of harmlessness,
but whether the trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. See id.
27 See id. at 1032-34.
28 See id. at 1034 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
29 Id. (Phillips, J., dissenting).
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:786
cessity of establishing an error of constitutional dimension on col-
lateral attack. Therefore, the court's application of a "fundamen-
tally unfair" standard for reversal, after it conceded the
unconstitutionality of the instructions in question, was improper.
This Comment will first discuss the difference between the bur-
dens that must be borne by defendants seeking to overturn an ad-
verse decision upon direct and collateral review. The Comment will
then examine the support relied on by the Fulton court and con-
clude that in its determination of whether conceded constitutional
error is sufficient to require reversal on collateral review, the court
erroneously applied the standard used by the Supreme Court to
determine if constitutional error is present.
DIRECT VERSUS COLLATERAL REVIEW
It is well settled that a federal appellate court's power of re-
view of a state conviction is "'the narrow one of due process, and
not the broad exercise of supervisory power that [it] would possess
in regard to [its] own trial court.' ,s A federal appellate court may
reverse the judgment of a district court within its jurisdiction even
though the error was not of constitutional dimension,31 but the ex-
ercise of such supervisory powers on collateral review of a state
court judgment is prohibited.2 To prevail on a collateral attack of
a state criminal conviction, a petitioner usually must establish the
" See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (quoting DeChristoforo v.
Donnelly, 473 F.2d 1136, 1238 (1973)); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)
(exercise of supervisory powers by federal appellate court to reverse inferior federal court
does not provide authority for reversing state conviction based on similar error).
" See, e.g., United States v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099, 1105 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1978) (error
to deny motion for court-conducted voir dire regarding possibly prejudicial publicity);
United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333, 340 (7th Cir. 1967) (judge's remarks during in-
structions on credibility of witnesses improper), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968). A defen-
dant who suffers an adverse judgment in federal district court may appeal as of right to the
federal court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). If the court of appeals considers the
district court judgment wrong, it may reverse the judgment through exercise of its supervi-
sory powers. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). But see United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 504-06 (1983) (reversal for failure to comply with procedural rule
inappropriate when error plainly would not have affected outcome of trial and other means
of attaining compliance available); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-45 (1943)
(court of appeals must balance purposes behind procedural rules required before reversing
district court for failure to comply with such rules).
3" See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141, 146 (1973); cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 570, 582-83 (1981) (Supreme Court
limited to constitutional questions on direct review and has no supervisory authority over
state courts).
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violation of some constitutional right.33 Thus, a petitioner must
demonstrate either an identifiable violation of a fundamental con-
stitutional right made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment,3 4 or a trial error which "so infected the trial with un-
fairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process." 35
In determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred
as a result of erroneous jury instructions, a reviewing court must
first consider the challenged portion of the instructions in isolation
to determine whether it could reasonably have been understood by
the jury in a manner inconsistent with the accused's due process
rights.3 The court must then review that portion in the context of
the jury charge as a whole to determine whether other instructions
might have compensated for the erroneous portion so that no rea-
sonable juror could have understood the charge in an unconstitu-
tional manner.37 This two-part procedural inquiry is aimed primar-
ily at determining whether an accused has been afforded a
"fundamentally fair" trial.38
LACK OF PRECEDENT
Although the Supreme Court has deemed harmless error anal-
13 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146
(1973). Although habeas relief may conceivably exist when a state prisoner is imprisoned in
violation of a federal law or treaty, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982); supra note 3, virtually all
habeas actions by state prisoners involve federal constitutional claims, see supra note 3.
U See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (right to adequate assistance of
counsel); Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 238-39, 244 (1966) (privilege against self-
incrimination).
31 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); see, e.g., Stumbo v. Seabold, 704
F.2d 910, 911, 912 (6th Cir. 1983) (prosecutorial misconduct); Tarpley v. Estelle, 703 F.2d
157, 161 (5th Cir. 1983) (instruction on offense not included in indictment).
6 Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1971 (1985); see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 514 (1979).
37 Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1971. Compare Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517
(1979) (given lack of qualifying instructions as to legal effect of presumption, instruction
unconstitutional when jury could have interpreted in unconstitutional manner) with Cupp
v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 149 (1973) (instruction that "witness is presumed to speak the
truth" cured by instruction that witness could be discredited by his own manner or words).
38 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S.
141, 147 (1973); Reeves v. Reed, 596 F.2d 628, 629-30 (4th Cir. 1979). The question of
whether an accused has received a "fundamentally fair" trial has been used to define the
constitutional threshold in other due process contexts as well. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips,
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (possibly biased juror); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-90
(1978) (failure to give requested "presumption of innocence" instruction); Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (prosecutorial misconduct).
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ysis appropriate in habeas corpus proceedings, 9 the Fulton court
determined that such an analysis is inappropriate in the context of
collateral review of a constitutionally erroneous jury charge.4 0 The
court relied implicitly on Henderson v. Kibbe,41 in which the Su-
preme Court stated that a habeas corpus petitioner bears the
heavy burden of showing fundamental unfairness due to allegedly
erroneous jury instructions.42 However, a careful reading of Hen-
derson demonstrates that the question of fundamental fairness, in
a due process context, is merely a determination of whether consti-
tutional error was present at trial.43 Unlike the Fulton court, the
" See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (after determining violation of
right to counsel at pretrial corporeal identification, Court remanded to determine whether
error was harmless or writ of habeas corpus should issue); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S.
371, 372 (1972) (even if testimony concerning confession by habeas petitioner should have
been excluded, "record clearly reveals that any error in its admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt"); see also L. YACKLE, supra note 1, § 90, at 219-20 (1985 Supp.) (discuss-
ing several approaches used by courts in analyzing habeas petitioners' claims for reversible
constitutional error). In Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 949 U.S.
866 (1980), the court noted two tests for harmless constitutional error on a petition for
habeas relief: (1) "whether the error was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt'" (citing
Chapman and Harrington); and (2) "whether 'in light of the totality of the circumstances
. . . the defendant received a constitutionally fair trial'" (quoting Kentucky v. Whorton,
441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (per curiam)). Krzeminski, 614 F.2d at 125. The court continued by
noting that "[i]n theory, the Chapman-Harrington test is triggered only upon a demonstra-
tion of constitutional error while the 'totality of the circumstances' approach is used to de-
termine whether admitted error was egregious enough to reach constitutional proportions in
the first place." Id.
o See Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032.
41 431 U.S. 145 (1977); see Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032. The Fulton court cited the previ-
ous Fourth Circuit decision of Morris v. Maryland, 715 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1983), as support.
Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032. Morris, however, relied on the Henderson decision for the point
for which it was cited by the Fulton court. See Morris, 715 F.2d at 108.
42 Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154-55.
43 Id. at 154-57. Standing alone, the Henderson Court's oft-quoted statement that
"[t]he burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will
support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even
greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal," id. at 154, could
possibly be read as requiring a habeas petitioner to show something more than "simple"
constitutional error, see, e.g., Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032 (standard is whether instructional
error tainted while proceeding such that conviction violates due process); Morris v. Mary-
land, 715 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1983) ("habeas petitioner must meet a 'stricter standard of
proof. . . to show [constitutional] infirmity' than is required on direct review of a criminal
conviction") (quoting Cooper v. North Carolina, 702 F.2d 481, 483 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983)). How-
ever, it is submitted that such an interpretation can be supported only if "plain error" as
used by the Court in that statement is construed as referring to constitutional error. This
analysis of the meaning of the oft-quoted statement is clear when read in the context of the
paragraph in which it is found. The Court continued: "[t]he question in such a collateral
proceeding is 'whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the
resulting conviction violates due process,' not merely whether 'the instruction is undesirable,
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Henderson Court specifically found that no constitutional error
had been committed." Therefore, the Fulton court's contention
erroneous, or even universally condemned,"' Cooper, 702 F.2d at 484 (quoting Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). By "undesirable, erroneous, or even 'universally con-
demned,'" it is submitted, the Court was specifically not referring to errors of constitutional
dimension. Moreover, a careful reading of Cupp reveals that the Cupp Court was merely
contrasting the ability of a federal appellate court to reverse inferior federal courts in an
exercise of supervisory power with the inability of a federal court to reverse a state criminal
conviction absent some constitutional violation. See Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146. Thus, the two
statements by the Henderson Court, when read in conjunction and with an understanding
of the language quoted from Cupp, establish that the Court was referring to the necessity of
a showing by the petitioner of some violation of constitutional rights before habeas corpus
relief is justified. This is apparently the manner in which other courts have interpreted
Henderson, as several have applied harmless error analysis in habeas cases after finding
constitutional error present. See, e.g., In re Hamilton, 721 F.2d 1189, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 1983)
(case remanded to lower court which was instructed to grant habeas writ if lower court's
shifting burden on issue of intent to defendant was not harmless); Engle v. Koehler, 707
F.2d 241, 244-46 (6th Cir. 1983) (instructions which shifted to defendant burden of proof
regarding malice put to harmless error test). In fact, several courts have applied harmless
error analysis in habeas cases after citing Henderson in an earlier portion of the opinion.
See, e.g., Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1339, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1982) (in light of over-
whelming proof of defendant's guilt, erroneous instructions were harmless); Dietz v. Solem,
640 F.2d 126, 130, 131 (8th Cir. 1981) (instruction which unconstitutionally shifted burden
of proof to defendant subject to harmless error test); Simmons v. Dalsheim, 543 F. Supp.
729, 738, 748-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (some constitutional violations do not demand an "auto-
matic reversal"), aff'd, 702 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Redman, 457 F. Supp. 929,
931, 935 (D. Del. 1978) (instructions which required defendants to prove alibi defense by a
preponderance not harmless).
" Compare Henderson, 431 U.S. at 156-57 (no constitutional error committed by omis-
sion of more complete instructions on causation) with Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1031 (expressing
"little doubt" that burden-shifting instructions were constitutionally infirm and noting that
state conceded constitutional error). The fact that the Court failed to find any error of con-
stitutional dimension in Henderson necessarily calls into question the statement made in
Morris v. Maryland, 715 F.2d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1983), and quoted in Fulton, that "our task
on this appeal is not to apply the harmless error analysis of Chapman v. California,. . . but
rather the test laid down by Henderson v. Kibbe." Morris, 715 F.2d at 109 (quoted in
Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032). It is possible that the Morris court meant that if the "fundamen-
tally unfair" test of Henderson is met, the question of whether the error was harmless under
the Chapman test is necessarily answered in the negative, since, upon determining that
constitutional error was present, the Morris court granted the writ of habeas corpus without
further discussion. See Morris, 715 F.2d at 111. If this is the case, it is submitted that the
Fulton court simply misconstrued Morris.
However, it is more likely that the Morris court construed Henderson as requiring a
more stringent standard for reversal than Chapman, because the statement previously al-
luded to was made in the context of a discussion pertaining to the distinction between direct
and collateral review. See Morris, 715 F.2d at 108-09. It is submitted that if this is the
correct view of the Morris rationale, then the Fulton court merely exacerbated an erroneous
interpretation of Henderson. It is difficult to imagine that the Henderson decision, which
involved the search for constitutional error, was meant to displace Chapman, which in-
volved the question of whether a constitutional error was harmless. Compare Henderson,
431 U.S. at 156-57 with Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26. Although Henderson was a habeas corpus
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that a habeas corpus petitioner must show fundamental unfairness
resulting from erroneous instructions in addition to constitutional
error is without support.45 To the contrary, the position taken by
the Fulton court is directly at odds with several other Supreme
Court decisions in which erroneous instructions were deemed to
rise to the level of constitutional error.46 It is submitted that there
are practical consequences in the application of the standard of re-
versal enunciated by the Fulton court that adversely affect a
habeas corpus petitioner's rights. The Supreme Court has held
that the beneficiary of a constitutional error bears the burden of
case, while Chapman was a direct appeal, it is submitted that, in light of the fundamental
difference between the two pertaining to the presence of constitutional error, one simply has
no effect on the application of the other. Cf. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972)
(applying harmless error analysis to claim made in habeas proceeding).
45 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. In addition to citing Henderson, the
Fulton court supported its position with a portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice Ste-
vens in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). See Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032 & n.6 (citing Rose
v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 & n.8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Paraphrasing Justice
Stevens, the court stated that "[t]here are errors that cannot be considered harmless on
direct review but are nevertheless insufficient to render a trial so unfair as to justify use of
the habeas corpus remedy." Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032. It is submitted, however, that this
reliance is misplaced with respect to the errors in Fulton. Although Justice Stevens did state
that there exist some constitutional errors "that are important enough to require reversal on
direct appeal but do not reveal the kind of fundamental unfairness to the accused that will
support a collateral attack on a final judgment," Rose, 455 U.S. at 543 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), Justice Stevens stated that the claims that belonged in this category are only those
that contravene constitutional rights prospectively, see id. at 543 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). The reasonable-doubt requirement was held by the Court to warrant retroactive appli-
cation, see Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204 (1972), as was the prohibition
against burden-shifting instructions, see Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 240
(1977). It is therefore submitted that Justice Stevens remarks provide no support for the
holding of the Fulton court.
"' See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 1973 (1985) (erroneous charge which
shifted burden of proof on issue of intent held reversible error); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (instructions to jury which, pursuant to state law, obligated defen-
dant to show heat of passion violated due process). Despite the fact that both Francis and
Mullaney involved habeas corpus petitions, in neither case did the Supreme Court even
allude to a requirement other than a showing of constitutional error. See Francis, 105 S. Ct.
at 1972-77; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 697-707. In Mullaney, once the Court had determined
that constitutional error had been committed, it granted the writ of habeas corpus without
further inquiry. See 421 U.S. at 703-04. In Francis, once the presence of constitutional error
had been determined, the Court turned to the question of whether the lower court had
properly applied harmless error analysis. See 105 S.Ct. at 1977. Although the Court found it
unnecessary to determine the propriety of applying harmless error analysis to burden-shift-
ing errors since the lower court was held to have correctly decided that the errors were not
harmless, it is submitted that, had a more stringent standard than harmless error been ap-
propriate in a habeas case, the Supreme Court would have remanded the case to the lower
court for that determination instead of affirming, or at least would have made some refer-
ence to the appropriate standard.
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convincing a reviewing court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
error was harmless. 47 However, under the Fulton standard, the
burden of establishing fundamental unfairness is borne by the pe-
titioner, the victim of constitutional error.48 Since the Fulton
court's "fundamentally unfair" standard for reversal effectively
displaces any harmless error inquiry,49 the practical effect of such
an approach is to shift once again the burden of proof to the defen-
dant, compounding the original trial error.50
CONCLUSION
In Fulton v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, the Fourth Cir-
cuit set a standard by which concededly unconstitutional burden-
shifting instructions that might be reversible on direct appeal may
not merit reversal on collateral review.51 Although there may be
some truth to the recent speculation of commentators that the Su-
preme Court has begun to limit the availability of habeas corpus
relief,52 there is currently no precedent for the Fulton court's sug-
gestion that a petitioner who complies with the procedural require-
ments of habeas corpus and alleges that the instructions at his trial
were unconstitutional must establish something more than the un-
constitutionality of those instructions to merit reversal of his con-
viction. By holding harmless error analysis inapplicable to burden-
shifting errors and obliterating the requirement that the prosecu-
tion bear the burden of showing harmlessness, the Fourth Circuit
has succeeded only in exacerbating the original constitutional er-
ror. In light of the fact that harmless error analysis is routinely
applied by the courts on collateral as well as direct review of all
constitutional errors not subject to automatic reversal, the Fourth
47 See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
48 See Fulton, 744 F.2d at 1032.
49 See id.; see also supra note 23.
50 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 45-46.
82 See, e.g., McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction: Legislative and Judicial Change, 28 CASE
XV. RES. L. REv. 517, 544 (1978) (courts appear to be exercising discretion granted by habeas
corpus statute to further doctrines which limit due process rights, and appellate jurisdiction
of Supreme Court in habeas context); Nichol, Backing into the Future: the Burger Court
and the Federal Forum, 30 KAN. L. REv. 341, 356-62 (1982) (discussing "erosion" of habeas
writ by Burger Court); Note, Emerging Jurisdictional Doctrines of the Burger Court: A
Doctrine of Convenience, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 316, 329 (1985) (procedural defaults result in
lack of habeas relief for state prisoners); see also L. YACKLE, supra note 1, § 21 (suggesting
possible reasons for Burger Court's doubt about advisability of expansive habeas corpus
jurisdiction).
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Circuit, without precedential support, has effectively singled out
burden-shifting errors as requiring some higher standard for rever-
sal than other constitutional errors.
Steven M. Post
